Can the Independent Football Regulator stop another Sheffield Wednesday? 

Guy Griffiths, Intern
13/11/2025

The recent existential crisis facing Sheffield Wednesday has once again put the financial stability of English football clubs under the political microscope. The Owls, who have been handed a 12-point deduction for entering administration, were last profitable in the 2016-17 season and have long been encumbered by financial woes and poor governance. Owner Dejphon Chansiri has finally run out of extra time following repeated warnings and from the EFL.

In this position, Wednesday joins a group of storied clubs; Leeds United, Portsmouth, Derby County, Bolton Wanderers, and the liquidated Bury FC. Despite various reforms from the existing footballing authorities to cut down on financial mismanagement, there is almost always a club in financial distress, suggesting deep structural issues in how English football is run. Bury’s liquidation in 2020 ended more than 130 years of history and demonstrated that self-regulation of football may have failed. That tragedy was a key catalyst for the government’s decision to create the Independent Football Regulator (IFR)-the supposed silver bullet for the sport’s chronic instability.

The IFR marks a monumental shift from self-regulation by footballing authorities to an independent, statutory regulatory regime. The IFR’s main objective is explicitly to ensure the financial stability and sustainability of English football, providing oversight to 116 clubs across the top five tiers of the game. Under the IFR’s plans, a strengthened approval process will be implemented for owners, directors and representatives, featuring a new suitability test that scrutinises a prospective owner’s financial soundness and resources.

However, the value of regulation is generated from the strength of its enforcement. The real teeth of the IFR lie in its extensive enforcement mechanisms, which are based on a mandatory licensing regime. Every club must hold a licence to compete in the top five tiers, and the IFR has strong powers to monitor and enforce compliance with licence conditions related to financial regulation, corporate governance, and fan engagement. For the most serious rule breaks, such as concealing or destroying relevant information, the IFR can refer cases for criminal prosecution, and according to its chair David Kogan, force an unsuitable owner to sell a club or suspend and ultimately revoke a club's operating licence, preventing the club from competing in its league.

Crucially, the IFR’s remit extends beyond club-level regulation to systemic reform. It holds ‘backstop powers’ to intervene in financial redistribution if the Premier League and EFL fail to reach an agreement. This is an implicit acknowledgement that the current wealth gap between tiers fuels reckless risk-taking lower down the pyramid. The IFR’s capacity to impose a settlement could finally force a more sustainable financial ecosystem, though it will likely face fierce political and commercial resistance in doing so.

Yet, the question remains whether oversight alone can correct decades of financial culture shaped by short-termism and speculative ownership. Regulation can enforce prudence, but it cannot manufacture good leadership or shield clubs from economic shocks. The IFR will need to strike a delicate balance between intervening enough to ensure sustainability without suffocating ambition or alienating investors.

The IFR has been given the mandate and the kit to tackle the financial crises that have plagued the game for decades. While an independent layer of scrutiny over owners and club finances could provide stability to the game fans have been calling for, Sheffield Wednesday supporters will be hoping their club does not become the next Bury FC. The question remains whether the IFR’s extensive powers will be enough to save the next club on the brink, or will another historic institution fall through the cracks of regulation?